

SEC. 111. TRANSPARENCY.

(a) **REPORT.**—Except as provided in subsection (c), not later than 60 days after receiving a report pursuant to section 110(a), the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense shall jointly make copies of the report available to the public upon request and at a reasonable cost.

(b) **COMMENTS.**—Except as provided in subsection (c), not later than 60 days after submitting comments pursuant to section 110(e), the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense shall jointly make copies of such comments available to the public upon request and at a reasonable cost.

(c) WAIVER.

(1) **AUTHORITY.**—The President may waive the requirement under subsection (a) or (b) with respect to availability to the public of any element in a report submitted pursuant to section 110(a) or any comments submitted pursuant to section 110(e) if the President determines that such waiver is justified for national security reasons.

(2) **NOTICE OF WAIVER.**—The President shall publish a notice of each waiver made under paragraph (1) in the Federal Register not later than the date of the submission to the appropriate congressional committees of a report required under section 110(a) or any comments submitted pursuant to section 110(e). Each such report and comments shall specify whether a waiver was made pursuant to paragraph (1) and which elements in the report or the comments were affected by such waiver.

SEC. 112. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.

(a) **IN GENERAL.**—There is authorized to be appropriated \$20,000,000 for fiscal year 2024 to carry out this Act.

(b) **RESCISSION.**—Of the amount appropriated under the heading “ASSISTANCE FOR EUROPE, EURASIA, AND CENTRAL ASIA” in title III of the Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs Appropriations Act, 2023 (division K of Public Law 117-328), \$20,000,000 is rescinded.

SEC. 113. TERMINATION.

(a) **IN GENERAL.**—The Office shall terminate on the day that is 180 days after the date on which amounts appropriated or otherwise made available for the reconstruction of Ukraine that are unexpended are less than \$250,000,000.

(b) **FINAL REPORT.**—Before the termination date referred to in subsection (a), the Special Inspector General shall prepare and submit to the appropriate congressional committees a final forensic audit report on programs and operations funded with amounts appropriated or otherwise made available for the military, economic, and humanitarian aid to Ukraine.

ORDERS FOR TUESDAY, MARCH 28, 2023

Mr. WHITEHOUSE. Mr. President, finally, I ask unanimous consent that when the Senate completes its business today, it stand adjourned until 10 a.m. on Tuesday, March 28; that following the prayer and pledge, the morning hour be deemed expired, the Journal of proceedings be approved to date, the time for the two leaders be reserved for their use later in the day, and morning business be closed; that following the conclusion of morning business, the Senate resume consideration of calendar No. 25, S. 316 postclosure; further, that at 11:30 a.m., the Senate vote in relation to the Johnson amendment No. 11 and Ricketts amendment No. 30;

that the Senate recess following the Ricketts vote until 2:15 p.m. to allow for the weekly caucus meetings; further, that at 2:30 p.m., the Senate vote in relation to the Cruz amendment No. 9 and Sullivan amendment No. 33, that at 5:15 p.m. the Senate vote in relation to the Scott of Florida amendment No. 13 and Hawley amendment No. 40; finally, that all previous provisions in relation to the amendment votes remain in effect, and with two minutes for debate, equally divided, prior to each vote.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

ORDER FOR ADJOURNMENT

Mr. WHITEHOUSE. If there is no further business to come before the Senate, I ask that it stand adjourned under the previous order, following the remarks of Senators CASSIDY, RUBIO, SULLIVAN, and BROWN.

I yield the floor.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Louisiana.

NOMINATION OF JULIE A. SU

Mr. CASSIDY. Mr. President, last Tuesday, President Biden formally nominated Julie Su to be the Secretary of the Department of Labor. Now, as ranking member of the committee that oversees her nomination, I felt it was important to express some concerns that have only grown since her previous nomination.

Deputy Secretary Su has a troubling record and is currently overseeing the Department of Labor's development of anti-worker regulations dismantling the gig economy.

This does not inspire confidence in her current position, let alone confidence that she should be promoted. Ms. Su's record now and in her previous position as secretary for the California Labor and Workforce Development Agency deserves scrutiny. I look forward to a full review and hearing process for her nomination.

In California, Ms. Su was a top architect of AB5, a controversial law that removed the flexibility of individuals to work as independent contractors.

Now, independent contractors, you can call them freelancers. They make their own hours, and they choose the type of work they wish to do. I was recently taking a Lyft. The driver told me he was able to clear \$500 a day. He has Uber, Lyft, and DoorDash on his phone. He flips between the apps, he chooses the job from whichever one is immediately available, and through it all, he clears 500 bucks a day. I said, wait a second, man, you gotta pay your gas, you gotta pay your insurance; are you still—Oh, yeah, I clear 500 a day.

Now, if he is working five days a week, he is doing \$10,000 a month. Independent contractors are shielded from forced or coerced unionization that could strip that flexibility away. This, of course, has made eliminating this classification a top priority for large labor unions who benefit from more

workers being forced to pay mandatory union dues.

Now, it is important to note, even in California, AB5 is extremely unpopular. And 59 percent of California voters supported a measure to exempt ride-share drivers from AB5.

The law is so flawed, the Governor and State legislature have had to pass multiple laws to exempt over 100 occupations. The statutory exemptions are longer than the text of AB5 itself.

But Ms. Su has taken her support for this anti-worker, pro-union policy to the U.S. Department of Labor. During her tenure as Deputy Secretary of Labor, essentially the Agency's chief operating officer, the Biden administration pushed to eliminate independent contracting via Federal Executive rulemaking.

Now, there was never any hope of getting AB 5—an AB 5-like law through Congress, so they pursued their goals through regulation.

And, if finalized, the new regulation strips 21 million Americans of their ability to classify themselves as independent contractors and enjoy the flexibility this provides.

This regulation would undermine the business model of services like Uber, Lyft, and DoorDash that provide valuable services and give drivers the ability and freedom to set their own hours and even hop between States.

I got off at the airport in New Orleans, Louis Armstrong International Airport, and the guy that picks me up has Maryland plates: Oh, yeah, I moved here like six months ago, wanted to come down for jazz fest, and so I just notified the different—you know, Uber and Lyft, and now I am down here working instead of back where I started.

We are talking maximum flexibility. By the way, it is not just the Uber and Lyft drivers affected; truckers are severely impacted.

Many truckers are independent owner-operators. They own their own trucks. This regulation could devastate the freedom of these truckers. It could potentially impact the supply chain in the process, as trucking moves more than 72 percent of the goods in the United States annually.

Now, as a conservative from a conservative State—but I think as an American from any State—I can say that we don't need the application of a law from one of the most liberal States to the entire Nation.

A law rejected in California is not a policy to be pursued on a Federal level. We need to support the right of workers and their ability to choose what is best for them, not put them in a strait-jacket to serve other people's goals.

I also want to hear Ms. Su's position on DOL's effort to uproot the franchise model, which employs over 8 million Americans. Deputy Secretary Su has made public comments indicating that she will pursue attempts at DOL to forcibly impose a joint employer classification on the almost 800,000 franchises operating in our communities,

the same as any other small business. Sadly, franchisors with liability for thousands of franchise owners that actually operate the small business would be a sure way to destroy the system of franchising, a model which has allowed those underrepresented in the business community—women, people of color—to have the ability to live the American dream, becoming successful small business owners as they help create jobs, lifting other workers out of poverty.

No one is surprised that the joint employer rule is a major priority for large labor unions. It is easier for them to pressure one company to unionize to increase their union dues than to pressure thousands of independent businesses.

The priority of the Biden administration should not be to do whatever makes it easier to forcibly and coercively unionize workers while undermining the business models of the establishments they work for. It should be to increase individual freedom and opportunity.

What comes to mind, there is a fellow north of Baton Rouge who moved here from West Africa to attend LSU. After he attended LSU, he became a citizen, and now he is a franchisor for multiple outlets. And he talks about the American dream: coming here from Nigeria as a transfer student; getting his citizenship; and now being an owner, involved in rotary, running for political office—a better American than most Americans. Somehow, this threatens the Department of Labor.

Now, in addition to our policies, we should ask questions about how Ms. Su presided over a mismanaged California unemployment insurance program during the pandemic and why California paid \$31 billion in fraudulent claims when she chose to suspend the eligibility determination process.

Some of these payments went to inmates and known domestic and international criminals. To put into context, the Department of Labor's requested budget is \$15 billion and employs more than 17,000 people. This means that Ms. Su lost more than double the annual budget of the Agency she will be responsible for managing in Washington, DC. This calls into question her qualifications as a manager.

Unfortunately, there will be many reasons to be concerned about Ms. Su's nomination to head the Department of Labor, and I look forward to a full hearing process to further discuss.

STUDENT LOANS

Mr. President, today we introduced the Congressional Review Act, Resolution of Disapproval, to overturn the Biden administration's unfair student loan schemes that transfer the burden of \$400 billion in Federal student loans from those who willingly took on that debt—and took on that debt to get a degree that would help them make more money—to American taxpayers who, perhaps, never went to college or already fulfilled their commitment to

pay off their loans, oftentimes sacrificing to do so.

The resolution would also end the pause on student loan payments, which, by August, will have cost taxpayers almost \$200 billion. President Biden has extended this pause six times, for a total of 31 months, far beyond the original justification of an ongoing pandemic. I am joined by 38 of my colleagues in offering this resolution.

Last August, President Biden announced his plan to cancel up to \$20,000 in Federal student loans from most borrowers and to extend the payment and interest accrual pause in student loans via executive fiat.

Make no mistake, this reckless student loan scheme does not forgive debt. It does not forgive debt at all. It just transfers the burden from those who willingly took out these loans for college—and, again, in order to make more money when they graduate—to Americans who never attended college and who have already paid off their loans.

And I would ask: Where is the forgiveness for the guy who didn't go to college but bought a truck, went to work, and is now working to pay off that loan? Is his truck loan going to be forgiven? It will not be.

And what about the woman who paid off her student loans but is now struggling to afford her mortgage? Does she get a refund to help her with the mortgage?

Is the administration providing them relief? And the answer is no. Instead, the administration had to not only pay their bills, but the bills for those who decided to go to college in order to make more money and then have their student loans forgiven. This is irresponsible and unfair.

And, by the way, the plan does nothing to address the problems that created the debt in the first place. It doesn't hold colleges or universities accountable for rising costs. According to the College Board, in the last 30 years, tuition and fees have jumped at private nonprofit colleges by 80 percent and at public 4-year institutions by 124 percent.

And it doesn't ensure that students are prepared for life after college. Indeed, it creates a terrible moral hazard that tells students that Federal student loans aren't real commitments and tells colleges that no matter how high they raise their prices or what product they produce, the Federal Government will cover the tab, courtesy of the American taxpayer.

Our resolution prevents average Americans, the 87 percent of whom currently have no student loans, from being stuck with a policy that the administration is doing, not to be fair to all but, rather, to favor the few.

Our resolution also protects the rule of law, which President Biden must know he is violating.

During Supreme Court arguments on the legality of the student loan forgive-

ness in February, Justice Roberts clearly indicated that if \$400 billion was to be spent on student loan cancellation, it would and should require congressional approval. That has not been given.

It is a clear example of this administration attempting to subvert Congress for what appears to be purely political purposes. It is a wildly dangerous precedent if left unchecked.

For Americans who cannot afford their debt or want a proactive approach to paying off their loan commitments, Congress has already authorized—again, let me just say this. For someone who can't afford their debt or wishes to be proactive to pay off their loan commitments, Congress has already authorized 31 different programs to help pay or forgive student loans.

I ask unanimous consent that the list of Federal programs already available to Americans who are struggling to repay their loans, work in public service, or who are in high-demand fields be printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

THE BIDEN ADMINISTRATION'S RECKLESS STUDENT LOAN SCHEME

There are already 31 active student loan repayment and forgiveness programs.

THREE FULL OR PARTIAL STUDENT LOAN FORGIVENESS PROGRAMS

Direct Loan PSLF—

Government organizations at any level (U.S. federal, state, local, or tribal)—this includes the U.S. military

Not-for-profit organizations that are tax-exempt under Section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code

Other nonprofit organizations that provide specified types of service (e.g., public health, public safety)

Stafford Loan Forgiveness for Teachers—

Teachers who:
teacher in a school or education service agency serving students from low-income families;

special education teacher, including teachers of infants, toddlers, children, or youth with disabilities; or

teacher in the fields of mathematics, science, foreign languages, or bilingual education, or in any other field of expertise determined by a state education agency to have a shortage of qualified teachers in that state.

Federal Perkins Loan Cancellation—

Early childhood education provider
Employee at a child or family services agency

Faculty member at a tribal college or university

Firefighter
Law enforcement officer

Librarian with master's degree at Title I school

Military service
Nurse or medical technician

Professional provider of early intervention (disability) services

Public defender
Speech pathologist with master's degree at Title I school

Volunteer service (AmeriCorps VISTA or Peace Corps)

Teacher in a low-income school
Teachers of math, science, foreign language, bilingual education, or other shortage subject areas

Special education teachers

23 active loan repayment programs for:

12 active repayment programs for federal employees in the following areas:

Senate employees
House Employees
Congressional Budget Office
Government Employee
Defense Acquisition Workforce—hard to staff civilian acquisition positions
Armed Forces: Enlisted members on Active Duty in Military Specialties
Members of the Selected Reserves
Health Professionals Officers Serving in the Selected Reserve with Wartime Critical Medical Skill Shortages
Chaplains Serving in the Selected Reserves
Education Debt Reduction Program—VA program for hard to staff areas
National Institutes of Health Intramural—Biomedical or biobehavioral research careers
National and Community Service grant program—AmeriCorps

11 Federal Student Loan Repayment Programs for broad employment needs or shortages

Veterinary Medicine—USDA
Indian Health Service—
National Health Service Corps—Health Resources and Services Administration (HRSA)
National Health Service corps students to service—HRSA
National health service corps state—HRSA
Loan repayments for health professional school faculty—HRSA
General, pediatric, and public health dentistry faculty loan repayment—HRSA
Nursing education LRP—HRSA
Nurse Faculty—HRSA
National Institutes of Health Extramural—NIH

John R. Justice loan repayment for prosecutors and public defenders—DOJ

Mr. CASSIDY. Mr. President, they range from total forgiveness under public student loan forgiveness, the PSLF; Stafford loans for teachers; and Perkins loans cancellations for law enforcement officers, military, early childhood educators, and social workers, to name few.

There are also repayment programs for high-demand fields, where education is specialized and the need is a public good. For example, through the Department of Health and Human Services, therapists and behavioral health providers who are needed to help our children as we face a mental health crisis are eligible for loan forgiveness.

In addition, there are repayment policies related to the income of an individual. There are five different programs to keep payments low compared to an individual's income and to cap the total time for repayment.

These are quite different from this mass transfer of debt under this reckless student loan scheme, which forgets that these existing programs were set up to target limited taxpayer resources to benefit those using their degrees to serve and to fill broader public needs or who can demonstrate that they, themselves, have a personal, individual need.

By the way, what benefit does the GI bill hold when students can just wait to have their student loans forgiven? Why contribute to your community by teaching in a public school while getting your Federal loans paid off

through your service when you can just wait for President Biden to forgive your loans? Irresponsible policies like President Biden's student loan scheme weaken these incentives and discourage Americans from going into public service.

President Biden and Secretary Cardona, come to the table. There are real problems in the student loan system and Federal financing of higher education. Let's fix them legally through a lasting, bipartisan solution.

I close by encouraging all my colleagues to join me in supporting this Congressional Review Act resolution to prevent this unconstitutional student loan forgiveness scheme. It is unfair to the hundreds of millions of Americans who will bear the burden of paying off hundreds of billions of dollars of someone else's student debt.

I yield the floor.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Florida.

TKTOK

Mr. RUBIO. Mr. President, back in 2019, I believe April of 2019, if not the first, I must have been one of the first people to call for the company TikTok to be banned in the United States. So it has been a while now; it is not something I just came up with the other day.

But I do think that is a pretty extraordinary thing, to ban a company, and so before I think we—for someone like me, who has argued for a national ban on a company like this, to take away something from over 100-and-something million Americans, many of whom I have heard from, many of whom I know personally—before we do something like that, I think people deserve an explanation as to why is it that we would want to do that. I don't think the answer can just be "Trust us. It is bad for America." I think they do deserve an answer, and I think they do deserve a clear argument as to why it is in our national interest to do this and why it is the only option we have.

First, I think it is important to understand how TikTok works. It is an ingenious app—no one argues about it—these short-form videos, and it always seems to show you what you want to see. The more you use it, the more it shows you the things you want to see.

How does it do that? Well, it does it two ways. First of all, it scoops up an extraordinary amount of data—not just data on what you are watching, all kinds of data. CNBC actually talked about it. TikTok, you know, collects your content that you viewed, content you created, shared. Beyond that, it includes your contact list. It collects your name, your age, your user name, your emails, your messages, your photos, your videos, and other personal information. In fact, in 2021, TikTok changed its privacy policies. It can now even collect biometric data, like your faceprint—you know that thing you use when the phone unlocks?—and the voiceprint of its users. It is an extraordinary amount of data.

But that is not the only thing it does—because I hear some people criticizing us and all they talk about is, well, everybody collects data. It is not just the data. What really makes TikTok so effective is that it has an algorithm that uses artificial intelligence to combine all of this data and your usage, and what that does is it basically—that algorithm, it knows you better than you know yourself. It knows the videos you are going to like before you even know you are going to like them, and it is an extraordinary power behind this. It is what they call a recommender engine. We are going to call it an algorithm. It is a predictor.

Now, people would say: Well, what is the big deal? All social media app companies do that, not just them. I mean, Netflix does it to recommend movies you might want to watch, and Spotify does it to recommend music. Clearly, Instagram and Facebook and Snap and Twitter—all of them have an algorithm, and all of them collect data. So what is the big deal? What they are doing is no different than anything else.

Here is the difference. The difference is, of all these companies I just mentioned to you, the only one that has a parent company that is a Chinese company that owns it is ByteDance. And it is not just that there is a Chinese company; they own and they operate the heart and soul of TikTok, the recommender engine, the algorithm. That belongs to ByteDance. In order for this to work, in order for TikTok to work, ByteDance has to have access to the data of Americans. They have to.

Now, here is where people will say to you: Well, so what if it is a Chinese company? It doesn't all have to be American companies.

Actually, the CEO of TikTok was here last week, and he said: You know, ByteDance—I am trying to paraphrase it, but I wrote it—is not owned or controlled by the Chinese Government. They are a private company that is owned by outside investors that include Americans.

Well, this is disingenuous. It is not true. And let me tell you why it is not true.

First of all, there is no such thing as a private company in China—not in the way we think of a private company. Let me explain why.

In China, No. 1, they have a law called the national intelligence law, and the national intelligence law of China requires—doesn't ask for; doesn't say: We can go to court and require you to do this. No, no. It automatically requires—the national intelligence law of China requires every single Chinese company—that includes ByteDance—to do whatever the Government of China tells them to do.

China has another law. It is called the data security law. What that law says is that every tech company in China—like ByteDance, a tech company in China—they have to hand over to the government whatever user information—whatever information they

want. They have to do it by law. That is a big difference between them and these other companies.

So the bottom line is this when it comes to those who argue that it is not a company controlled by the Chinese Government—I read the other day that China says they are going to block any forced sale of TikTok. Well, how could China block the forced sale of TikTok if they don't control TikTok? The reason they can block it is because they control—the government, through these laws—they control the company that controls the algorithm that drives TikTok. It is controlled by ByteDance. Under Chinese law, if the Government of China tells ByteDance, the owner of TikTok, to use the algorithm a certain way, they have to do it.

It doesn't matter who the shareholders—it doesn't matter if 100 percent of the shareholders of ByteDance are Americans. If they are located in China and the Chinese Government tells them: We want you to use the algorithm and the data you have access to in a certain way, they have no choice but to do it. That is not just true for ByteDance; that is true for every company in China.

So a lot of people say: OK. Well, then, the solution is this: Let's just store all the American data here in America. Let's just put it all in a server located in the United States, and that will do the trick.

No, it won't, and here is why. Even if you stored all of the data that TikTok has on Americans—over a hundred-something million users—even if you stored all of it, ByteDance in China still has to be given access to that data. You may have it stored in America, but you have to give access to ByteDance. Do you know why? Because the algorithm that TikTok depends on doesn't work without the data. ByteDance has to have access. That is almost like putting your life savings in a safe but then giving the thief the combination. Who cares that it is in the safe? Who cares where the safe is? If the thief has the combination, they can get into the safe.

So it doesn't matter where you store the data; if ByteDance owns the algorithm, they have to have access to the data, and if they have access to the data, the Chinese Government has access to the data whenever they want.

The latest iteration is, well, what we should do is we should force TikTok to be sold. Sold to whom? TikTok is worthless—worthless—without the algorithm. So even if TikTok, as we know the company, is bought by Americans, they still need the algorithm that ByteDance owns, and you can't buy the algorithm from ByteDance even if they wanted to sell it to you. Do you know why? Do you know why ByteDance can never sell you the algorithm, the recommender engine that powers TikTok? Because the Chinese Government in 2020 imposed a law that prohibits it. The Chinese Government specifically imposed a law in 2020 that

says you cannot transfer the algorithm outside of China. So selling it is not going to make a difference because no matter who buys it, TikTok is worthless. It won't work without the algorithm. The algorithm belongs to ByteDance, ByteDance is in China, and they have to do whatever the Chinese Government tells them to do.

This is where people have said to me: Well, who cares? Who cares if the Chinese Government controls the algorithm and has access to the data?

They want me to explain how an app that features funny videos and the latest dance fad—how that is possibly a national security threat. So let me walk you through a very realistic hypothetical.

Let's suppose for a moment that China decides they are going to invade Taiwan in 2027 or 2028, and the key to a successful invasion or taking of Taiwan is to prevent the United States of America from getting involved, and the key to keeping the United States from getting involved is to convince the American people that we shouldn't get involved because they know we are a democracy. They know that public opinion matters in America.

Knowing all this, the Chinese Government goes to ByteDance, who, by law, has to do whatever they are told, and the Chinese Government says to ByteDance: We want you to align your algorithm to shape American public opinion on Taiwan.

They won't do this overnight; they will spend a couple years laying this out.

We want you to align your algorithm to make sure that people in America are seeing messages that convince them that America should not get involved, and not only that, we want you to use the data to target specific American audiences with specific messages.

For example, some Americans might see a bunch of videos that allege to show people in Taiwan—probably fake but nonetheless people in Taiwan supporting a Chinese takeover. Maybe family members—remember, they have all this data on us. Family members of military members would see videos about how thousands of Americans will die if the United States gets involved. Others might see videos of Americans—or who they think are Americans—arguing: Why do we care about Taiwan? We should be focused on our problems here at home.

When we notice that they are doing something about it—that is what people will say: Well, when that happens, then you deal with it.

Well, once you notice that they are actually doing it and we try to do something about it, do you know what comes next? Here is what comes next—what is already happening now. You are going to have a bunch of small businesses in America that depend on marketing on TikTok. And let me tell you something. I don't diminish that. It is true. I know people who have built up their businesses, and they use

TikTok for marketing, and it works. It is better than the other apps for that.

But just imagine when we go to them and say: Guys, we have to shut TikTok down now because now it is real. Now they are using it against us.

Those people are going to come up and say: You are going to destroy my business.

In fact, China will probably threaten those people. China will probably make it very clear: The U.S. gets involved, we are going to knock all the Americans off of TikTok. Down goes your business.

Those people will suddenly be asking their elected official here not to get involved in Taiwan. Do you know where we find ourselves then? Paralyzed. A country that is paralyzed, that cannot act in its own national security interests because we have allowed an adversary to basically use an app that they control and the data that they control to shape public opinion in America over an extended period of time, and we can't do anything about it.

Now, here is where some people will say: Well, that is a violation of the First Amendment—free country.

I agree. You have a right to speak. I don't agree that it is a violation of the First Amendment; I agree that you have a right to speak and say anything you want in America.

This is not about the content of the video. What this is about is the existence of a company that is related to an important government interest.

What is that government interest? It is not just a substantial government interest; it is the most important government interest that we have—the national security of our country. And preventing our country from being paralyzed from acting in its national security interest is the most compelling and important government interest one can imagine.

Now, people say: Well, this is all hypothetical. There is no evidence the Chinese Government is doing any of this.

Well, let me first start by saying that every threat to our national security begins as theoretical before it becomes reality.

For example, China is building hypersonic missiles designed to sink our ships. They are not firing them at our ships today. They are not sinking our ships. They are not even threatening to sink our ships openly. Yet, somehow, everybody around here agrees that we have got to do something about the hypersonics.

But they are not doing it now. It is theoretical, right?

Russia has never launched nuclear missiles against the United States, but we spend a lot of money every year on NORAD, on monitoring our skies, on making sure that we aren't being attacked. It is a theoretical threat, but one we have taken seriously for 70 years.

Second, what is so theoretical about using propaganda during a time of war?

There is nothing theoretical about propaganda during war and conflict. In fact, propaganda has been a weapon that has been used in virtually every conflict for centuries to demoralize and to divide your adversary.

Third, this is not just theoretical. We have actually seen TikTok be used to drive messages and to undermine opponents. It was used to spread pro-Russian messages during the invasion of Ukraine. It has been used to suppress videos talking about Tiananmen Square and the genocide of Uighur Muslims in China. It is already being used to censor all kinds of—in fact, it was used. It was used to control content and limit content about our elections in this country in 2022.

It goes more. I can go further than that. ByteDance has already been used. ByteDance China has already been used to collect data on specific reporters whose stories ByteDance didn't like. So they used it to track the locations of these reporters.

Where are they? Who are they talking to? In fact, here in America—here in America—TikTok was caught spying on American journalists who were writing stories that TikTok didn't like, and TikTok denied it: It is not true; it is a lie.

And then they had to admit it. So now, it is: Oh, we fired the people who did this.

And now they are under Justice Department investigation.

But here is the point I would say about this whole theoretical thing. If God forbid—and I say “God forbid,” I really do, because no one wishes for armed conflict with anyone. There is nothing good about war. If, God forbid, we are ever in a war with China, China will use cyber attacks to try to take down our electric grid. China will use space weapons to try to destroy the satellites we have in space. China will use these missiles to sink our ships and kill Americans.

China will do all these things, but somehow we think they are incapable of using a social media app with 150 to 200 million users. They would never use that against us. They will sink our ships, shoot down our satellites, shut down our grid, but they would never use an app that they control. Come on. Of course, they would.

Look, there is a lot more to say on this topic, and this is one we should debate and talk about. This is a big deal. Don't take this lightly.

But I will say this. You know, since 1991, America has been the sole superpower in the world. I would venture to guess that almost everyone who serves here did not serve in government at a time when America had a near-peer adversary, for the most part. So I think we, generally, as a nation—certainly, the government—have forgotten what it is like to live in a world in which there is another country and another government that has almost as much power as we do. But, after 30 years, that is where we are. That is where we

stand right now. Whether we like it or not, we are in a near-peer competition and, in many ways, a conflict with China for global influence, for the direction of the world, with two very different views of the planet—with the Government of China, by the way, because I always hear people talk about this: We have no problem. The Chinese people are the No. 1 victims of the Chinese Communist Party on the planet. The No. 1 victims of the Chinese Communist Party are the Chinese people.

But their government—it is very simple, guys. They want to be the world's most powerful country, and they want to do it at our expense. And the consequences of that is that the world's most powerful country will be a nation that puts Uighur Muslims in death camps; that is trying to destroy Tibetan culture; that had no problem massacring their own people in Tiananmen Square; that as we speak, right now, are arming the Russians to commit these atrocities in Ukraine; that don't believe any of the things we are debating about free speech and the like.

We are in a competition, and we are in a conflict—hopefully, never an armed one, but, nonetheless, a conflict. And we have, operating in our country, an app—the fastest growing app—a social media app that has the most detailed personal data on over 100 million American users and growing, and they are turning over the power for, one day, for them to use it to divide us, to paralyze us, to confuse us, to turn us against each other.

Think of the damage that Russia did by putting bots, fake accounts, on Twitter and buying ads on Facebook. Can you imagine if Russia actually owned Facebook or Twitter—not put ads, not put bots, but actually controlled those companies—the damage they would have done to this country?

Now, imagine that with a country with an economy 50 times the size and with 100 times more capabilities, because that is what we are facing here.

It is not a game, and we should take it seriously. If there is a way to deal with this that doesn't involve a ban or something drastic, I have always been open to that. But it doesn't exist because of the way this company is structured. And we had better take it seriously or one day, 20, 30 years from now, people will look back and say: You guys should have taken it seriously—and we failed to do so, and we paid the price for it.

We should act on it as soon as possible. We should ban TikTok because it is bad for America. It harms our country, and it is a danger to our future.

I yield the floor.

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Ms. SMITH). The Senator from Ohio.

Mr. BROWN. Madam President, I thank Senator RUBIO for his comments.

Whenever I hear my colleagues rail against China—and I agree with that 95 percent of the time. Whenever I hear them say things like that they want to

be the world's most powerful country, the most powerful government, I agree with that.

But, as Senator RUBIO said—this isn't a debate between him and me. I just want to make a couple of comments. I want to talk about worker safety, in a moment, which I know the Presiding Officer cares so much about.

I go back half a generation. Senator RUBIO wasn't here then, but many of his ideological soulmates were here then. This Congress couldn't stop itself, from Presidents Clinton and Bush 1 and Obama and Bush 2 and Trump—couldn't help themselves—from giving all kinds of breaks to American corporations and incentives to American corporations to go to China, to move to China.

So they shut down production in Duluth, MN. They shut down production in Mansfield, OH, my hometown, and Toledo and Youngstown.

As corporations were lobbying Congress, I worked and I teamed up with LINDSEY GRAHAM, a Republican, against that. We were unsuccessful, as corporations lobbied Congress to give China something called permanent normal trade relations.

So they shut down production in Ohio. They moved that production to China. And what happened? They taught China a whole lot about manufacturing, and they created a whole lot of wealth in China.

Now we are surprised about TikTok. We are surprised that the Chinese military is as powerful as it is. I just think it is important that we remember, when we listen to corporate interests in this body who lobby here to weaken, to push jobs overseas, that these are the kinds of things that happen. And I hope we learn from that, and I hope we take a lesson and apply it to TikTok into the future.

So, Senator RUBIO, thank you for raising the issue.

WORKER SAFETY

Madam President, I want to talk about worker safety for a moment. On Friday, seven American workers went to work in West Reading, PA, at the RM Chocolate Factory to provide for their families.

I spoke to Senator CASEY about this, who is the senior Senator from Pennsylvania and who is one of the leaders in fighting for worker safety in this body. I spoke with him about it a few minutes ago.

Those seven workers never came home after an explosion leveled the plant. Our thoughts are with the families who lost sons and daughters, workers who were paid decent wages, not exorbitant wages—decent wages—and never returned home to their families.

We will learn more about what went wrong. I know Pennsylvania workers will always have an ally with Senators CASEY and FETTERMAN on this issue and so much more.

This struck me in a more emphatic way because I believe it was 1 day before the 112th anniversary of the Triangle Shirtwaist factory fire. That

tragedy woke up the Nation to the dangers that workers face in their jobs—dozens of workers, because the management had locked the factory doors because they were afraid that some of these low-paid, mostly women, some of them very young, workers might steal a blouse or two. They locked the factory doors. So when this fire broke out in a very flammable environment, workers jumped out the windows to their deaths—dozens and dozens of workers.

That made a huge difference in Congress finally dealing with worker safety.

In fact, a woman who was nearby, heard the sirens, and came to the scene was named Frances Perkins. She became the first female Secretary of Labor, under President Roosevelt. She stayed with him his entire 12-plus years in office and played a big role, with Senator Wagner, in writing the most pro-worker legislation in this Nation's history, especially on worker safety.

Now, Madam President, I wear this pin on my lapel. I have worn it since it was given to me 25 years ago, at a workers' Memorial Day rally, by the steelworkers. It is a picture of a canary in a bird cage.

The mine workers, 120 years ago, used to take a canary down in the mine. If the canary died from toxic gas or lack of oxygen, the mine worker got out of the mine. He had no union, in those days, strong enough to protect him. He had no government, in those days, that cared enough to protect him.

We changed that because of worker safety laws. We changed that because of unions. This tragedy in West Reading, PA, reminds us that our work to protect workers and make workplaces safer never ends.

I think about those steelworkers who lost their lives near Toledo in an explosion in a refinery in Oregon, OH, last year. Max Morrissey and Ben Morrissey were brothers who died in that accident.

I think about the Norfolk Southern worker who worked for Norfolk Southern, and, because of its culture of laying off workers and compromising safety and paying big compensation bonuses to executives, the worker at Norfolk Southern lost his life earlier this month.

No worker should have to worry about returning—kissing her husband goodbye, kissing his wife goodbye, kissing his or her children goodbye, they should not have to worry about returning home. That is why we should stand up to corporate lobbies that always want to cut costs—worker safety be damned.

We know what happened. We saw in East Palestine what happened because the railroad laid off a third of its workers and then they compromised on safety. We saw what happened in Silicon Valley Bank when they didn't pay attention to consumers and regulators and the public interest.

And, again, workers always pay the price. We know what will happen. Every time there is an industrial accident, people are upset; they worry about it.

But the companies continue to lobby regulators for weaker laws. We see it here with corporate lobbyists. We see it in the regulatory Agencies, when they always want to weaken consumer laws, they always want to weaken environmental laws, they always want to weaken worker safety laws, and communities always pay, and workers always pay.

That is why a union card is so powerful. It means higher wages, better benefits, and a safer workplace. If you love this country, you fight for the people who make it work, whether they punch a clock or swipe a badge or whether they work for tips or whether they work on salary. You fight to keep people safe on the job. That is our job here, to make sure we do that better than we have in the past.

I yield the floor.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Alaska.

S. 316

Mr. SULLIVAN. Madam President, we are debating, last week and this week, the authorization for the use of military force authority that was granted in 2002, which is a really important debate that we are seeing right here on the Senate floor.

By the way, it is a good-faith argument. There are Members on both sides of the aisle making different arguments.

There is not a topic, in my view, more important than the issues at stake here—how to use military force; when to use military force; is it authorized by the President to use military force?—because, as to the issue of the U.S. Government sending young men and women into harm's way to defend our country's interests, there is nothing more important, in my view—nothing more important.

I appreciate the time and the debate here on the floor. It is also important because it wraps into—when you talk about young men and women going into harm's way overseas, one of the biggest harms to American service men and women over the past 20 years has actually been from Shia militia groups supported by Iranian terrorist organizations. Now, it doesn't always seem to make sense in that Americans who were killed in Iraq and wounded in Iraq were often—and I will give some of the numbers here—killed and wounded because those who did the killing and wounding were supplied by Iranian terrorist groups. In particular, the Quds Force, which was led by Qasem Soleimani, during the course of the Iraq war, killed over 600 American servicemembers and wounded over 2,000 with very sophisticated IEDs that were supplied by the Iranians to their proxies in Iraq.

So what does any of this have to do with the 2002 AUMF for Iraq that we

were debating last week and will debate this week? Well, the answer is everything, everything.

We eventually figured out—we, the United States—that these very sophisticated IEDs, which are called explosively formed projectiles or penetrators, EFPs, were actually, as I mentioned, caused by the Iranians. It took some time to figure this out because, like so many things, the Iranian terrorists in Tehran and the ayatollahs lie—they lie—and they denied it. "Oh, we didn't have anything to do with that." Well, they actually had everything to do with that. Again, the best and brightest in America, in my view, for many years, during the Iraq war, were being killed by Iranian terrorists and being led by Qasem Soleimani, who was the head of the Quds Force, that was doing this.

During that time of 2005 to the middle of 2006, I was serving as a Marine Corps staff officer to the commanding general to the U.S. Central Command, General Abizaid. I was deployed to many parts of the CENTCOM AOR with the CENTCOM Commander. Probably the biggest concern, no doubt, was of these incredibly effective, brutally efficient EFPs that were killing and wounding so many of our best and brightest. To this day, it is just remarkable to me that so few people even know about this or talk about it—the killing and maiming of thousands of American troops by the Iranians and the Quds Force, led by General Soleimani.

Again, what does this have to do with the 2002 AUMF? Everything.

What happened during that time?

Well, when we figured out it was the Iranians doing this, we—we, again, the national leadership—never really retaliated against Iran at all. Imagine that. We knew that they were killing and wounding thousands of our best and brightest, and the United States did not do anything to establish deterrence. As a matter of fact, during that time, we lost deterrence, and it became clear that Iran, with good reason, started to think: Hey, we can kill American servicemembers with impunity. There is no price.

So they did.

When you lose deterrence with a terrorist regime that likes to kill Americans and has a history of killing Americans, it is not a good thing, especially for the young men and women who are serving our country in dangerous places.

I remember, early on in my Senate tenure here, in a briefing we had in the SCIF, I asked the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs: Do you think we have lost deterrence? There have been 600 Americans killed and over 2,000 wounded. Do you think the Iranians believe they can kill as many American servicemembers as they can—again, America's best and brightest—and not pay a price?

The Chairman said: Yes. The Chairman said: Yes.

I remember that very distinctly.

So the whole point is, How do you reestablish deterrence? Because, if you reestablish deterrence, you are going to save lives, and you are going to protect your servicemembers.

Again, there is nothing more important that we do as a country than making sure the men and women who go defend our country—who defend us, who defend our interests—are protected, are lethal, are the best trained. But it is difficult because, when you lose deterrence, it is hard to get it back. Well, we did get it back, and I certainly applaud President Trump and the Trump administration.

When Qasem Soleimani was back in Iraq, scoping American forces to kill—by the way, a lot of them during that time were from Alaska—in early January 2020, the Trump administration said: The joke is over. This guy with the blood on his hands of thousands of our best and brightest—he is not doing it again.

And he was killed during a daring strike on January 3, 2020. He was looking to kill more American troops in Iraq, and he got killed. I think it was justified and an important signal to send to everybody around the world that you can't go around killing American troops and not expect to have retaliation against you or your country. That should be basic. That should be basic. Every U.S. Senator here, today, should agree with that 110 percent.

The Trump administration said: We are not going to allow this anymore, and the guy who is responsible for killing so many Americans and wounding so many Americans—he is going to pay.

And he did, with his life.

The legal authorization for that very justified killing was the 2002 AUMF that we are debating right now. OK. That was only 3 years ago that that happened. So it is very relevant to the issue of deterrence and very relevant to the issue of Iran.

For some of my colleagues to say: Well, it is old. It has nothing to do with anything that is happening right now, they couldn't be more inaccurate. This matters, and it matters today. For those who say it doesn't, they don't know this history or they don't want to know this history or they haven't been watching the news for the last 96 hours.

Some of us are concerned about the very debate we are having here, which is to say: Let's remove the authorization that we used to kill Soleimani. Let's get rid of it. Hmm, what kind of signal does that send? Could this signal maybe we are not worried about deterring Iran anymore? Could this signal that removing this authorization, this 2002 authorization that, again, was used to regain deterrence with Iran—if we got rid of it, would this embolden Iran?

Well, as I mentioned, in the last 96 hours, we have had Iranian proxies unleashing deadly attacks on American servicemembers and American contrac-

tors. That is happening right now. Is it a coincidence? I don't know. One American is dead, and five have been wounded with these brazen attacks. Some of us thought this actually might happen. It is happening. It is happening.

Unfortunately, there was a little bit of something going on last week that we are going to get to the bottom of. Trust me. On the Armed Services Committee, we are going to get to the bottom of it because, last Thursday, when we were debating the AUMF, these vicious attacks started at 6:30 a.m., DC time. It was on the day we were debating the AUMF—all day Thursday. We didn't hear about it until the close of business Thursday. Was somebody hiding that information from us? It was pretty relevant information. We are going to find out about that.

I am going to be offering an amendment to the AUMF tomorrow, and I believe every U.S. Senator should vote for it. Here is why: I believe that the 2002 AUMF clearly helped with deterrence. It was the authority, in addition to article II, to take out one of the biggest terrorists, heck, in the 21st century. That is for sure. He killed more Americans than any other terrorist. That is for sure.

So the question is, Will removing this AUMF lessen American deterrence against Iran's malign activities?

That is what my amendment asks the Director of National Intelligence to do—to look at that question and certify the answer. If the answer is no, then this new AUMF or the removal of this AUMF can go forward.

Again, it is a really simple question: Ask the DNI, for the next 30 days, to look at this question: Will removing the 2002 AUMF lessen American deterrence against Iran's malign activities?

Why wouldn't every U.S. Senator want to go: "That is a really good question. Heck, we are seeing it in the Middle East right now—in Syria. Maybe this is going to embolden Iran. Heck, maybe we shouldn't do it. Maybe, by doing this, we are going to put American servicemembers' lives at risk. Hmm. Maybe we shouldn't do it. Let's ask the DNI?"

That is it. Why wouldn't you want that?

I was just talking to a couple of the proponents of this AUMF debate. Again, I have a lot of respect for them, but I asked them: Why wouldn't you want this? Wouldn't you want to know? Just wait 30 more days. I know you have been trying to get this removed for years. Wait 30 days. Send it to the President's own Director of National Intelligence and ask her: Review the intelligence. Review what you are hearing with the chatter among the Iranian proxies who are trying to kill Americans and who have killed Americans. Is any of this related to the removal of the AUMF? Then give us an answer in 30 days, and if the answer is no, this can move forward. If it is yes and this will hurt our deterrence against Iran, then we shouldn't be doing this.

That is all my amendment is asking. It simply says: As for the authorization for use of military force—the AUMF—of 2002, if it is voted on to be repealed, which it looks like it will be, it will go into effect after the Director of National Intelligence certifies in an intelligence assessment to Congress that the repeal will not degrade the effectiveness of U.S.-led deterrence against Iranian aggression. Who could be against that? We should have 100 U.S. Senators wanting to know the answer to that question, especially given what just happened over the last 96 hours, because maybe this debate is emboldening the Iranian proxies and terrorists. Maybe it is not. So let's get the answer.

My amendment would also make sure that it is 100 percent clear that if the 2002 AUMF is repealed, the United States can fully retaliate against the Iranians or any Iranian threat if they are threatening our country or our people.

I know that most of my colleagues here agree with that. We negotiated that language with some of my Democratic friends and Republican friends. So it is just that and this issue of asking the DNI to certify that what we are doing on the Senate floor right now is not going to undermine our deterrence against Iran and, oh, by the way, put more American lives at risk.

It is simple. I would be shocked if any Senator voted against wanting to know the answer to that basic question.

I am asking my colleagues to just think hard. Don't you want more information? Can't you wait 30 more days to get President Biden's DNI to certify that what we are doing right here in the Senate is not going to undermine deterrence and put more American lives at risk? I hope that all of my colleagues would agree with that and vote on my amendment.

Finally, I will just say, the deterrence that we regained with the justified killing of Soleimani has clearly been slipping away, particularly once the Biden administration came into office, and it is a concern.

I was on a recent bipartisan codel to the Middle East, and the No. 1 issue we were hearing about in every single stop by every single leader was the malign activities of Iran. You name the country we were in—and we were in a lot of them, all the Abraham Accords countries in Israel—Iran was the No. 1 topic and how aggressive they are getting.

The lifting of the terrorist designation for the Iranian-backed Houthis almost in the first month of this administration, February 2021, was a sign of weakening deterrence against Iran.

The administration's inability to stand firmly with the United Arab Emirates, one of our strongest allies in the Middle East, when it was attacked by Houthi missiles and drones—of course, with the Iranians' help—was something else that lessened our deterrence.

Just last week, when the CENTCOM Commander testified, he said there had been 78 similar attacks on American forces since 2021. We are losing deterrence. That is during the Biden administration's 2 years. They have been attacking the hell out of our troops. What are we doing? What are we doing?

The mullahs in Tehran, like all tyrants, are emboldened by accommodation. So I am asking my Senate colleagues to take the very prudent, logical, and responsible step to ask the DNI if what we are getting ready to do here on the Senate floor, which is to remove the 2002 AUMF, will that undermine our deterrence against Iran? Let's wait 30 days and get the answer.

Don't put your head in the sand, my colleagues. Stand up. See what the answer is from the DNI so we can move forward in a way that makes sense for our national security, deterrence of the world's largest state sponsor of terrorism, and, most importantly, the ability to protect and defend our servicemembers serving overseas in places like Syria that are very dangerous.

I yield the floor.

ADJOURNMENT UNTIL 10 A.M. TOMORROW

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senate stands adjourned until 10 a.m. tomorrow.

Thereupon, the Senate, at 7:35 p.m., adjourned until Tuesday, March 28, 2023, at 10 a.m.

NOMINATIONS

Executive nominations received by the Senate:

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

ANN ELIZABETH CARLSON, OF CALIFORNIA, TO BE ADMINISTRATOR OF THE NATIONAL HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMINISTRATION, VICE STEVEN SCOTT CLIFF.

IN THE AIR FORCE

THE FOLLOWING NAMED OFFICER FOR APPOINTMENT TO THE GRADE INDICATED IN THE UNITED STATES AIR FORCE UNDER TITLE 10, U.S.C., SECTION 624:

To be colonel

DAVID M.P. SPITLER

IN THE ARMY

THE FOLLOWING NAMED INDIVIDUAL FOR APPOINTMENT TO THE GRADE INDICATED IN THE RESERVE OF THE ARMY UNDER TITLE 10, U.S.C., SECTION 12203:

To be colonel

JORGE M. ARZOLA

THE FOLLOWING NAMED INDIVIDUAL FOR APPOINTMENT TO THE GRADE INDICATED IN THE REGULAR ARMY MEDICAL CORPS UNDER TITLE 10, U.S.C., SECTIONS 531 AND 7064:

To be major

JAMES F. CANTORNA

THE FOLLOWING NAMED INDIVIDUALS FOR APPOINTMENT TO THE GRADE INDICATED IN THE REGULAR ARMY MEDICAL CORPS UNDER TITLE 10, U.S.C., SECTIONS 531 AND 7064:

To be major

SANDEEP R. RAHANGDALE
CHRISTIE A. SHEN

THE FOLLOWING NAMED INDIVIDUAL FOR APPOINTMENT TO THE GRADE INDICATED IN THE REGULAR ARMY MEDICAL CORPS UNDER TITLE 10, U.S.C., SECTIONS 531 AND 7064:

To be major

SONG QU

THE FOLLOWING NAMED OFFICER FOR APPOINTMENT TO THE GRADE INDICATED IN THE UNITED STATES ARMY UNDER TITLE 10, U.S.C., SECTION 624:

To be major

TIMOTHY S. MCKIDDY

THE FOLLOWING NAMED ARMY NATIONAL GUARD OF THE UNITED STATES OFFICERS FOR APPOINTMENT TO THE GRADE INDICATED IN THE RESERVE OF THE ARMY UNDER TITLE 10, U.S.C., SECTIONS 12203 AND 12211:

To be colonel

KEVIN J. HUXFORD
SEUNG H. LEE
JOHN D. MCRAE II
BRANDON K. PETERSON
KEVIN D. POTTS
DAVID A. RIDGEWAY

THE FOLLOWING NAMED OFFICERS FOR APPOINTMENT TO THE GRADE INDICATED IN THE UNITED STATES ARMY MEDICAL CORPS UNDER TITLE 10, U.S.C., SECTIONS 624 AND 7064:

To be colonel

KYLE D. AEMISEGGER
ALICE L. ALVERIO
FERDINAND K. BACOMO
JOHN B. BALMAN
ETHAN S. BERGVALL
AARON M. BETTS
DAVID V. BODE
BRIAN W. BRENNAN
SHAUN R. BROWN
ANGELA R. BRYAN
MEGAN L. CHILDS
MICHELLE S. CLARK
GUY T. CLIFTON
CHRISTOPHER COWAN
JUSTIN M. CURLEY
JESSE P. DELUCA
SALLY P. DELVECCHIO
RAMONA A. DEVENNEY
MICHAEL M. DICKMAN
DELNORA L. ERICKSON
RYAN P. FLANAGAN
DENNIS T. FUJII
ANDREW C. GALLO
JOHN J. GARTSIDE
SUZANNE M. GILLERN
ROSCO S. GORE
JON R. GRAY
SKY D. GRAYBILL
AMIT K. GUPTA
JEFFREY A. GUTHRIE
MITCHELL T. HAMELE
MELINDA J. HAMER
JASON N. HARRIS
JACOB S. HOGUE
SONNY S. HUITRON
PAUL F. HWANG
BENJAMIN J. INGRAM
JONATHAN JI
MICHAEL J. KILBOURNE
JEEHUN M. KIM
RYAN M. KNIGHT
MATTHEW D. KUHNLE
NOELLE S. LARSON
GARY LEVY
JAMES E. MACE
ANTHONY L. MARK
ANA E. MARKELZ
SHANE P. MCENTIRE
BRANDI S. MCLEOD
NATHAN E. MCWHORTER
DAVID E. MENDOZA
GARRETT J. MEYERS
JOHN E. MUSSER
JAMES NICHOLSON
FREDERICK P. OBRIEN
MOROHUNRANTI OGUNTOYE OUMA
RASTISLAV OSADSKY
SHIMUL S. PATEL
TANVI D. PATEL
JESSICA J. PECK
KEITH H. PENSKA
PAUL G. PETERSON
JENNI PICKINPAUGHINOCENCIO

TIMOTHY P. PLACKETT
TORIE C. PLOWDEN
JOHN J. POULIN
NADER Z. RABIE
MEGHAN F. RALEIGH
LUIGI K. F. RAO
BRADLEY A. RITTENHOUSE
PAUL M. ROBBER
DEREK J. ROGERS
CHRISTOPHER J. ROSEMEYER
FRANCISCO C. RUBIO
JENNY L. RYAN
LIEN T. SENCHAK
JUSTIN M. SHIELDS
ADAM T. SOTO
DANIEL STINNER
ZOE E. SUNDELL
ERIC M. SWANSON
DANIEL J. TOLSON
WILLIAM WASHINGTON
PRISCILLA WEST
KRISTOPHER C. WILSON
NOUANSY K. WILTON
SEAN R. WISE
VLADIMIR S. YAKOPSON
PAULA YOUNG
D017212

THE FOLLOWING NAMED OFFICERS FOR APPOINTMENT TO THE GRADE INDICATED IN THE UNITED STATES ARMY DENTAL CORPS UNDER TITLE 10, U.S.C., SECTIONS 624 AND 7064:

To be colonel

AILEEN R. CABANADALOGAN
DANIEL G. CHATTERLEY
PETER N. DROUILLARD
NICKOLI DUBYK
JOSEPH M. DUTNER
BRANDON M. GAGE
JAMES M. GIESEN
KAREN E. GONZALEZTORRES
NGHIA N. HO
ANTHONY C. KIGHT
JACOB L. KITSON
AGNIESZKA KUCHARSKA
DAVID H. KWON
SLOAN D. MCLAUGHLIN
LARRY L. MUNK
ELIZABETH R. OATES
SAMUEL E. POINDEXTER
CRYSTAL J. SMITH
JOHN F. UNDERWOOD

THE FOLLOWING NAMED OFFICER FOR APPOINTMENT TO THE GRADE INDICATED IN THE UNITED STATES ARMY NURSE CORPS UNDER TITLE 10, U.S.C., SECTIONS 624 AND 7064:

To be major

JEROME C. FERRIN

IN THE MARINE CORPS

THE FOLLOWING NAMED OFFICER FOR TEMPORARY APPOINTMENT TO THE GRADE INDICATED IN THE REGULAR MARINE CORPS UNDER TITLE 10, U.S.C., SECTION 8287:

To be major

NATHAN D. MORRIS

IN THE NAVY

THE FOLLOWING NAMED OFFICERS FOR APPOINTMENT TO THE GRADE INDICATED IN THE REGULAR NAVY UNDER TITLE 10, U.S.C., SECTION 531:

To be lieutenant commander

RYAN E. DINNEN
MATHEW C. MILLER

THE FOLLOWING NAMED OFFICER FOR APPOINTMENT TO THE GRADE INDICATED IN THE UNITED STATES NAVY UNDER TITLE 10, U.S.C., SECTION 624:

To be lieutenant commander

JILLIAN M. MEARS

THE FOLLOWING NAMED OFFICER FOR APPOINTMENT TO THE GRADE INDICATED IN THE UNITED STATES NAVY UNDER TITLE 10, U.S.C., SECTION 624:

To be captain

MARY J. HESSERT

THE FOLLOWING NAMED OFFICER FOR APPOINTMENT TO THE GRADE INDICATED IN THE UNITED STATES NAVY UNDER TITLE 10, U.S.C., SECTION 624:

To be captain

DAVID WAGENBORG